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CURA PERSONALIS: A HEALTHCARE DELIVERY QUANDARY AT 
THE END OF LIFE 
GEORGE P. SMITH, II* 
ABSTRACT 
Holistic Medicine traces its provenance to the foundational value or 
chrism of the Society of Jesus of cura personalis which directs respect be 
given to all individuals and to their souls — especially whenever medical 
healing is required. Today, the notion of best patient care should include 
not merely attention to somatic issues of refractory pain management but, 
equally, to non-somatic or existential suffering. It is at the end-stage of life 
that palliative — as opposed to curative — care must be provided. When a 
condition is seen as medically futile, this Article advocates palliative or deep 
sedation — when consistent with patient values — should be accepted more 
fully as efficacious and humane end-of-life medical care. 
Roman Catholic moral theology supports the ideal that extraordinary 
medical measures need not be provided in order to preserve life at its end-
stage. The International Association of Catholic Bioethicists acknowledged 
in 2011 that holistic interventions — when appropriate and consistent with 
best patient care — should seek to address existential or spiritual suffering 
by sedation. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Before history was ever recorded, healers have served society.1 Indeed, 
in Western society, the provenance of healing may be traced to classical 
Hellenic Greece.2 Other cultures have a similar history which derives from 
traditions which hold to the notion of “selfless service to those in need.”3 
From these historical glosses, it may be surmised “that whole patient care 
was being dispensed long before the term was coined.”4 Professionalism, as 
a concept and in association — specifically — with medicine, has thought 
to have been first used by Scribonius, a Roman physician, circa 47 A.D. to 
mean “a commitment to compassion or clemency in the relief of suffering,”5 
which in turn was seen as the essence of caring for the whole person.6 With 
the founding of the Society of Jesus by St. Ignatius of Loyola in 1541, cura 
personalis has been recognized as a foundational value or chrism of Jesuit 
education.7 An integral part of this value is particular acknowledgment that 
“attention and respect [must be] given to the care of an individual person 
and that person’s soul.”8 
Over time, the roles of curing and of healing began to be defined more 
distinctly between that of the physician and the patient — for, it is the 
physician’s knowledge and expertise which gives him more decisive power in 
curing.9 In the healer function, however, it is the patient who becomes the 
center of power — since, the healing occurs within the patient who makes 
“the healing journey.”10 Today, it is said that there is a therapeutic alliance 
 
 1. Richard L. Cruess & Sylvia R. Cruess, Whole Person Care, Professionalism, and the 
Medical Mandate, in WHOLE PERSON CARE: A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 201, 201 
(Tom A. Hutchinson ed., 2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Cruess & Cruess, supra note 1, at 202. 
 6. Id. See GARY B. FERNGREN, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY (2009). 
 7. See Timothy J. Cook, Professional Educator Preparation in the Jesuit Tradition, in 
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION HANDBOOK: UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAM 5 (Lynn Olson ed., 2002), 
available at http://www.creighton.edu/fileadmin/user/CCAS/departments/education/docs/ 
ElemUG_Handbook.pdf (on file with the St. Louis University Journal of Health Law and Policy). 
Cura personalis is the founding principle of the Georgetown University Medical Center in 
Washington, D.C. See GEORGETOWN UNIV. What is Cura Personalis (2011), http://som. 
georgetown.edu/about/curapersonalis. 
 8. CATHARINE RANDALL, BLACK ROBES AND BUCKSKIN 21 (2011). See DAVID F. KELLY, 
GERARD MAGILL & HENK TEN HAVE, CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE ETHICS 24 (2d ed. 
2013). See IMAGO DEI: HUMAN DIGNITY IN ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE (Thomas Albert Howard 
ed., 2013). 
 9. Tom A. Hutchinson, Whole Person Care, in WHOLE PERSON CARE: A NEW PARADIGM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1, 4 (Tom A. Hutchinson ed., 2011). 
 10. Id. 
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between physician and patient and that a “participatory moral agency” 
exists.11 
In 1940, rather dramatically, with the publication of Paul Tournier’s 
MEDICINE DE LA PERSONNAE,12 the doctor-patient relationship was shown to 
be “illuminated equally by faith and by medicine.”13 Tournier advanced the 
idea that spirituality was not only a significant vector of force in this 
relationship, but indeed, was complementary to the practice of medicine.14 
This dialogue started by Tournier, continues today15 with more and more 
acceptance of the centrality of spiritual care to healthcare “particularly in 
palliative and end-of-life care, where a holistic approach is established as 
both a philosophy and model of care.”16 Yet, even with this level of 
acceptance, much uncertainty and ambiguity pervade regarding the extent 
to which spiritual needs are addressed.17 
A. New Holistic Directions 
Building upon the principle of cura personalis, a new form of medicine, 
termed “systems medicine,” is developing.18 Seeking to expand medical 
education and treatment beyond reductionism, and to outreach — 
holistically — in order to consider economic, ethical, and socio-legal 
values, systems medicine incorporates not only the biochemical and 
physiological but also the “environmental interactions that maintain living 
 
 11. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, LAW AND BIOETHICS: INTERSECTIONS ALONG THE MORTAL COIL 
138-60 (2012). 
 12. See PAUL TOURNIER, MEDICINE DE LA PERSONNAE (1940). 
 13. John Cox, Alastair V. Campbell & Bill Fulford, Introduction: At the Hearth of Healing, 
in MEDICINE OF THE PERSON: FAITH, SCIENCE AND VALUES IN HEALTH CARE PROVISION 17, 19 
(John Cox et al. eds., 2007). 
 14. See Paul Tournier, A DOCTOR’S CASEBOOK IN THE LIGHT OF THE BIBLE (1954). Tournier 
advocated that total medical care for the whole person must include biological, psychological, 
social, and spiritual issues. See Hans-Rudolf Pfeifer & John Cox, The Man and His Message, 
in MEDICINE OF THE PERSON: FAITH, SCIENCE AND VALUES IN HEALTH CARE PROVISION 33 (John 
Cox et al. eds., 2007). See Gary B. Ferngren, Medicine and Religion: A Historical Perspective, 
in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF SPIRITUALITY IN HEALTHCARE 3 (Mark Cobb, Christine M. Puchalski & 
Bruce Rumbold eds., 2012). See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLED DECISION-MAKING (2005). 
 15. See George P. Smith, II, Law Medicine, and Religion: Towards a Dialogue and 
Partnership in Biomedical Technology and Decisionmaking, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
169, 169 (2005) (showing how the conversation continues to this day). 
 16. Elizabeth Mackinlay, Care of Elderly People, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF SPIRITUALITY IN 
HEALTHCARE 251, 261 (Mark Cobb, Christine M. Puchalski & Bruce Rumbold eds., 2012). 
 17. Id. See Grace Davie & Martyn Percy, The Future of Religion, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF 
SPIRITUALITY IN HEALTHCARE 482 (Mark Cobb, Christine M. Puchalski & Bruce Rumbold eds., 
2012). 
 18. Howard J. Federoff & Lawrence O. Gostin, Evolving from Reductionism to Holism: Is 
There a Future for Systems Medicine, 302 JAMA 994, 994 (2009). 
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organisms.”19 While purporting to account for a multitude of complex 
vectors in disease prediction, a substantial challenge remains in actually 
quantifying multiple factors such as environmental ones.20 Systems medicine 
holds the promise of “greater precision in diagnosis, opportunity for earlier 
intervention, risk-based prevention, individualization of care, and 
optimization of the patient-client interface.”21 
B. Hospice and Palliative Care 
“Total pain” management of physical, psychological, and spiritual 
suffering was — since the beginnings of the modern hospice movement led 
by Dame Cicely Saunders in 1967 — the express goal of hospice care,22 
just as it is today.23 Indeed, palliating the whole person within an 
environment of compassionate support is central to sound hospice care 
and, thus, seeks to “humanize medicine.”24 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defined palliative care as that 
which “improves the quality of life for patients and families who face life-
threatening illness, by providing pain and symptom relief, spiritual and 
psychosocial support from diagnosis to the end of life, and bereavement.”25 
Palliating the whole person — then — requires medicine to attend more 
fully to existential suffering. For this type of palliation to be efficacious, 
healthcare decision makers must regularly reassess patient treatment goals 
in order to not only learn how their patients define and experience pain, but 
the patients’ thresholds for tolerating various sources of distress.26 These 
thresholds are seen as being informed by a patient’s personality, which has, 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 995. 
 21. Id. at 996. See Charles L. Bardes, Defining ‘Patient-Centered’ Medicine, 366 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 782, 782 (2012). 
 22. See Cicely Saunders, Hospice, 1 MORTALITY 317, 320 (1996). 
 23. See HOSPICE: THE LIVING IDEA (Cicely Saunders et al. eds., 1981). See also GEORGE P. 
SMITH, II, PALLIATIVE CARE AND END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS (2013). 
 24. See HOSPICE CARE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE 7 (Cicely Saunders & Robert 
Kastenbaum eds., 1997). See also Martha L. Twaddle, Hospice Care, in DIGNITY AND DYING: 
A CHRISTIAN APPRAISAL 183, 189 (John F. Kilner, Edmund D. Pellegrino & Arlene B. Miller eds., 
1996). 
 25. Palliative Care, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/cancer/palliative/en (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2013). See Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, In Hospice, but not Dying, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 27, 2013, at 1A (reporting on the growing $17 billion hospice industry dominated 
by for-profit corporations which are competing aggressively and recruiting patients not actually 
dying, thereby increasing the length of Medicare covered stays and then discharging the 
patients who are seen as “hospice survivors” and then live extended periods of time). 
 26. See Martin J. Fegg et al., Personal Values and Individual Quality of Life in Personal 
Values and Individual Quality of Life Palliative Care Patients, 30 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 
154 (2005). 
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in turn, been shaped by life experiences and attitudes toward death 
management and quality of life in end-stage illness.27 
C. Managing End-Stage Illness 
“Managing” death at the end-stage of life when a futile medical 
condition exists, presents linguistic, moral, and philosophical ambiguities 
regarding the voluntary cessation of nutrition, hydration, palliative or 
terminal sedation, physician-assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia.28 
Although these actions are distinct, there is a central and unifying 
commonality among them — specifically, their common purpose of 
hastening a humane death, thereby showing compassion to those 
experiencing refractory pain and existential suffering.29 
The purpose of this Article is to argue, and to advance the notion, that 
existential suffering is as valid a consideration as physical pain is at the end-
stage of life. Because of this relationship, greater attention must be given by 
medicine to palliating the whole person and to accepting the validity of 
palliative sedation. As efficacious and compassionate treatment when 
appropriate,30 laws should — similarly — accommodate the necessity for 
this procedure as its use becomes warranted under a theory of adjusted 
care.31 Further, the law should validate palliative sedation as humane end-
of-life medical treatment and should not complicate, and thereby hinder, 
what are sound medical responses — consistent with patient values — to 
alleviating conditions deemed medically futile.32 Legislation allowing for 
death with dignity as enacted in Oregon,33 Washington,34 and Vermont35 is 
 
 27. Id. See FIONA RANDALL & ROBIN DOWNIE, END OF LIFE CHOICES: CONSENSUS AND 
CONTROVERSY (2009). 
 28. See STEVEN LUPER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEATH (2009). Society may be seen as moving 
from an absolute sanctuary of life view to a standard of quality of life when it accepts the 
Principle of Double Effect, refusals of treatment, and palliative or terminal sedation. JOHN B. 
MITCHELL, UNDERSTANDING ASSISTED SUICIDE: NINE ISSUES TO CONSIDER 23 (2007). 
 29. See George P. Smith, II, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care: 
Releasing an Unbearable Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469, 479 (2011). 
 30. See George P. Smith, II, Terminal Sedation as Palliative Care: Revalidating a Right to 
a Good Death, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 382, 382 (1998). 
 31. Smith, supra note 29, at 475. A continuum of adjusted care commences from the 
initial diagnosis through the end-stage of illness and is modified, then, medically and 
palliatively as deemed necessary to accommodate the best interests of the patient to avoid 
pain and suffering and thus receive compassionate care. See DAVID C. THOMASMA, HUMAN 
LIFE IN THE BALANCE 211 (1990). See also Joanne Kenen, A New Focus on Easing Pain: 
Palliative Care Helps the Very Ill, It May Also Keep Costs Down, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, at 
F1. 
 32. See JENNIFER RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 183-84 (2009). 
 33. OR. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 127.800(12), 127.805 (West 2005). 
 34. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245(13) (2009). 
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— outside of state judicial action validating assistance in dying when a futile 
medical condition exists36 — the most sensible approach toward achieving 
social justice.37 
II.  BEST PATIENT CARE 
The President’s Council on Bioethics concluded in 2005 that the basic 
standard for clinical decision-making should be one which promotes the 
best patient care.38 This standard obviously must be continually adjusted as 
a patient’s case history progresses,39 and to promote patient care anchored 
in mercy, compassion, beneficence, and loving charity — care which 
recognizes that relief of pain is the most universal moral obligation that a 
physician must uphold and that there is, indeed, a right not to suffer.40 
Psychological distress, or existential pain, however, is usually difficult to 
assess because evaluation requires special training and continual contact 
with the patients’ families.41 There is a general societal aversion to the 
obstacles faced in proving a patient’s emotional distress at end-of-life 
care.42 Distinguishing between depression and psychological morbidity is 
difficult because the symptomology of disrupted sleeping patterns, loss of 
energy, and lack of appetite are not exclusive response mechanisms to 
psychological distress, but appear in cancer and other terminal illnesses as 
 
 35. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5281(10) (West 2013). 
 36. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009) (where, while declining to declare a 
constitutional right to die with dignity, the Montana Supreme Court held that physicians aid in 
dying was not violating the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, nor against any state public policy 
forbidding such conduct). 
 37. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE NEW MEDICINE 38-47 (2008). 
See also Katy Butler, A Full Life to the End, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2013, at C1 (urging 
autonomous healthcare decisions be made in anticipation of medical crises so that use of 
medical technologies given routinely to individuals over 80 facing healthcare emergencies in 
intensive care units can be forestalled). 
 38. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN OUR AGING 
SOCIETY 217 (2005), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/taking_care/ 
taking_care.pdf. Best patient care is adjusted to the developing medical needs of the patient. 
Essential to the standard of best care is acceptance of the “intrinsic dignity of persons” which, 
in turn, mandates that the goal of providing care must be to enhance total patient well being 
(somatic and non-somatic) and, at the end of life demonstrate beneficence, compassion, or 
charity in managing pain and suffering. 
 39. DAVID C. THOMASMA & GLENN C. GRABER, EUTHANASIA: TOWARD AN ETHICAL POLICY 
129 (1991). 
 40. Id. at 193-94 (quoting Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino). 
 41. Manish Agrawal & Ezekial J. Emmanual, Attending to Psychological Symptoms and 
Palliative Care, 20 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 624, 624 (2001). 
 42. Id. 
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well.43 Because of these difficulties and uncertainties, the palliative 
management of existential pain has been largely neglected.44 
While no general “solutions” exist for meeting the existential needs of 
terminally ill patients, attempts to meet these needs require careful listening 
skills and defined lines of communication between healthcare providers, 
patients, affected families, and proxy or surrogate decision makers. Valid 
existential concerns are often obscured during palliative care treatment.45 
Even though a patient may have no absolute control over the wide and 
varied spectra of suffering, the patient still has freedom to choose what 
attitude is taken toward that suffering.46 By extending end-of-life care to 
include psychiatric, psychological, existential, and spiritual issues — 
consistent with the WHO’s definition of palliative care and its goal of 
addressing total patient needs47 — a more complete, compassionate, and 
realistic approach to managing terminal illness and end-stage suffering 
would be implemented.48 
III.  ASSESSING PAIN 
While pain is properly seen as biological and measurable, it is — 
inherently — subjective, individual, and variable.49 Consequently, there is 
no clear understanding whether mental suffering and mental pain are, 
indeed, “equivalent or identical concepts and experiences.”50 Interestingly, 
some research has even suggested that the same brain regions involved in 
assessing physician pain are also found in a number of forms of actual 
emotional distress.51 The central issue confronting law is how to deal with 
the “externally verifiable reality” of pain.52 What level of exculpation should 
be granted by the state to those attending to the anguish and suffering of 
those at the end-stage of life.53 Can pain and suffering in death be likened 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Ingrid Bolmsjo et al., Meeting Existential Needs in Palliative Care—Who, When, and 
Why?, 18 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 185 (2002). 
 46. William Breitbart et al., Psychotherapeutic Interventions at the End of Life: A Focus on 
Meaning and Spirituality, 49 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 366, 371 (2004). 
 47. See HOSPICE, supra note 23. See Jane E. Brody, The Treatment that Respects Pain, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2013, at D7 (reporting on the uses of palliative care in hospice). 
 48. See Breitbart et al., supra note 46, at 371. 
 49. Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates 
Moral Decisions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 805-06, 810-11 (2012). 
 50. Id. at 825 n.93. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 803. Pain neuroimaging, or more precisely functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) is being used to measure pain. Id. at 846. 
 53. Id. at 817-25; Smith, supra note 29, at 515-24. 
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to the state’s responsibility to safeguard its citizens from suffering cruel and 
unusual punishment?54 
Although existential pain has been defined as suffering “with no clear 
connection to physical pain,” it has been recognized — nonetheless — as 
suffering,55 which in fact, can be expressed as physical pain. Today, 
existential pain is seen, commonly, as an important clinical factor either 
reinforcing existing pain or, serving as the root cause of it.56 
A. Existential Suffering 
The desire to hasten death arises because of a number of conditions: 
inadequate pain management, psychological conditions ranging from 
depression and hopelessness, to fears of loss of autonomy and physical 
functioning,57 to futile and unbearable suffering, and avoidance of 
humiliation.58 All of these conditions conduce to one overriding fear: loss of 
human dignity,59 which brings with it a fear of being forced to become but a 
“passive bystander” to all of the normal functions of life.60 
B. Death Anxiety 
Coping with death anxiety or, in other words, the “untarnished 
awareness of death,” often brings into play psychological mechanisms such 
as denial-based strategies of suppression, repression, and new emphases 
on religious beliefs which “detoxify” death itself.61 Existential terror is, then, 
sought to be managed spiritually by embracing the notion that life is, truly 
 
 54. See JONATHAN HERRING, Ethic of Care, in CARING AND THE LAW 46 (2013); SMITH, 
supra note 23. See also George P. Smith, II, Utility and the Principle of Medical Futility: 
Safeguarding Autonomy and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (1996) [hereinafter Smith, Utility and the Principle of Medical 
Futility]; GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL EXISTS: SAFEGUARDING SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT 
TO BE FREE FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1997) (on file with author). 
 55. Peter Strang et al., Existential Pain—An Entity, or Provocation, or a Challenge?, 27 J. 
PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 241, 245 (2004). 
 56. Id. at 247. 
 57. Helene Starks et al., Why Now? Timing and Circumstances of Hastened Deaths, 30 J. 
PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 212, 216 (2005). 
 58. Gerrit van der Wal & Robert J. M. Dillmann, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 308 BRIT. 
MED. J. 1346, 1347 (1994). 
 59. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXITS: THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED 
SUICIDE FOR THE DYING 56 (2002). 
 60. Richard B. Gunderman, Is the Enemy?, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 40, 42 (2002). See 
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, in DIGNITY AND DYING: A CHRISTIAN 
APPRAISAL 105 (John F. Kilner et al. eds., 1996). 
 61. See IRVIN D. YALOM, EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 110-11 (1980). See also Stephen 
Liben, Empathy, Compassion, and the Goals of Medicine, in WHOLE PERSON CARE: A NEW 
PARADIGM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 59, 59 (Tom A. Hutchinson ed., 2011). 
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meaningful, which in turn has the effect of enriching cultural attitudes of self-
esteem.62 By creating opportunities for individuals to create positive societal 
experiences for themselves, their uniqueness, value, and even spiritual 
immortality serves, ideally, to mitigate the dread of death.63 
In approximately twenty-five percent of all terminally ill patients, 
depression and other mood disorders occur.64 Yet, interestingly, few receive 
pharmacological aid through anti-depressant prescriptions.65 As this Article 
shows, the main obstacle to a more liberal response to these patients’ needs 
is the lack of clarity in determining when a distressed, terminal patient is 
suffering from clinical depression or, instead, exhibiting a “normal grief 
response” to the dying process.66 The components of both of these 
syndromes are often vague, imprecise, and difficult to evaluate.67 
Commonly, when patients are obsessed with feelings of worthlessness, they 
lose their ability and desire to interact socially, and — indeed — lose their 
sense of hope they are properly assessed as suffering from clinical 
depression68 and should be given whatever dosage of analgesics is deemed 
necessary to alleviate that condition — because pharmacotherapy is 
ultimately the principal tool for symptom control.69 
Another drawback to accurate and prompt evaluations of psychological 
distress or existential suffering is often the inability of a physician or palliative 
care management team to understand patient views about suffering. As a 
spiritual phenomenon, suffering is often accepted in Christian communities 
as a meaningful and authentic community response to Jesus Christ’s own 
 
 62. Sheldon Solomon & Krista Lawlor, Death Anxiety: The Challenge and the Promise of 
Whole Person Care, in WHOLE PERSON CARE: A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 97, 98 
(Tom A. Hutchinson ed., 2011). See YOLAM, supra note 61, at 208 (“[A] sense of fulfillment, a 
feeling that life has been well lived, mitigates against the terror of death.”). See also, James F. 
Bresnahan, The Catholic Art of Dying, AM., Nov. 4, 1995, at 12, 13. 
 63. “A person may come to the moment of death full of bitterness, anger, fear, vanity, 
jealousy, greed and pride. A life lived this way may lead to a death died that way” — for, in a 
very real way, “[d]eath is a punctuation mark on a person’s life . . . the end of a long spiritual 
journey.” Daniel P. Sulmasy, Health the Dying: Spiritual Issues in the Care of the Dying Patient, 
in THE HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL AS FRIEND AND HEALER: BUILDING ON THE WORK OF EDMUND 
D. PELLEGRINO 188, 195-96 (David C. Thomasma & Judith Lee Kissell eds., 2000). 
 64. Karl E. Miller et al., Antidepressant Medication Use in Palliative Care, 23 AM. J. 
HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 127, 127 (2006). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 128. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Arthur G. Lipman, The Scream by Edvard Munch: A Profound Portrayal of Existential 
Suffering, 19 J. PAIN & PALLIATIVE CARE PHARMACOTHERAPY, no. 1, 2005, at 1, 2. 
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suffering.70 In some faith communities, cultural efforts are expanded in order 
to view suffering — physically and mentally — as a positive, reinforcing 
value. Merely accepting suffering as authentic, however, does not mean that 
it is also meaningful.71 It remains for the physician to ascertain and then 
listen carefully to the spiritual parameters within each patient’s character72 in 
an attempt to treat those seriously ill as whole persons.73 In this way, the 
therapy is truly patient-centered.74 
Refractory existential suffering — or those symptoms which defy 
adequate control despite all efforts to provide relief — is difficult to 
distinguish during the end-stages of life from physical distress.75 Those 
additional refractory symptoms most commonly reported as requiring 
palliative sedation are: various degrees of agitation, restlessness or distress, 
confusion, respiratory distress, pain, and myoclonus (e.g., severe twitching, 
jerking or uncontrollable shakes).76 
Existential care is more often than not left to the nursing staff.77 Even in 
the daily hospital bed environment, however, the nursing staff must possess 
a special level of sensitivity to understand patients’ indirect questions 
regarding the depth and severity of their distress over their terminal illness. 
Once understood, it typically falls upon the nurses to devise a procedure for 
providing empathetic support.78 Palliative sedation therapy is thus defined as 
“the use of sedative medications to relieve intolerable and refractory distress 
by the reduction in patient consciousness.”79 When patient suffering — 
physical or existential — become refractory to standard palliative therapies, 
the humane, compassionate, and merciful response is to offer palliative or 
 
 70. Stan Van Hooft, The Meanings of Suffering, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct.1998, 
at 13, 15. 
 71. Id. at 14. 
 72. Id. at 15. See Martha D. M. Fowler, Suffering, in DIGNITY AND DYING: A CHRISTIAN 
APPRAISAL 44 (John F. Kilner et al. eds., 1996). 
 73. See Seth M. Holmes et al., Screening the Soul: Communication Regarding Spiritual 
Concerns Among Primary Care Physicians and Seriously Ill Patients Approaching the End of 
Life, 23 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 25, 25 (2006). 
 74. Alton Hart Jr. et al., Hospice Patients’ Attitudes Regarding Spiritual Discussions with 
Their Doctors, 20 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 135, 138 (2003). 
 75. Bernard Lo & Gordon Rubenfeld, Palliative Sedation in Dying Patients, 294 JAMA 
1810, 1812 (2005). 
 76. Id. at 1811. 
 77. Rob Houtepen & David Hendrikx, Nurses and the Virtues of Dealing with Existential 
Questions in Terminal Palliative Care, 10 NURSING ETHICS 377, 387 (2003). 
 78. Houtepen & Hendrikx, supra note 77, at 377. See Liben, supra note 61, at 59. 
 79. Tatsuya Morita et al., Definition of Sedation for Symptom Relief: A Systematic 
Literature Review and a Proposal for Operational Criteria, 24 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 447, 
447 (2002). 
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terminal sedation.80 This approach to medical treatment may be seen as 
consistent with sound principles of adjusted care.81 
C. Demoralization 
It has been suggested that — in the clinical setting of hospice or 
palliative care — a unique diagnostic category, termed the “demoralization 
syndrome,” is becoming more recognizable and should be refined and 
classified as a cognitive disorder.82 Seen as a “useful category of existential 
distress in which meaningless predominates and . . . profound hopelessness 
and [a] desire to die may result,”83 this syndrome, if not treated satisfactorily 
with pharmacological therapy, should render such a demoralized patient 
incompetent to make medical decisions.84 
Yet, interestingly, there is no conclusive empirical evidence to support an 
all too popular conclusion that depression so impairs judgment as to 
prevent one from competently disapproving of the initiation or cessation of 
medical treatment.85 Sadly, this depression argument would appear to be a 
ruse to obstruct and even prevent end-of-life decision-making on the 
grounds of moral repugnancy to alternative or surrogate healthcare 
providers.86 
If — and when — the demoralization syndrome is accepted by 
diagnosticians as a cognitive disorder, it would then remain for physicians to 
respond with compassion and care in remediating this medical condition. If 
deemed proper, under the overarching principle of medical futility, 
physicians should consider the reasonableness of alleviating this 
pathological mental state in the end-stage patient by administering palliative 
or terminal sedation. Such a course of treatment would be consistent with 
the central obligations of all physicians to alleviate pain and suffering — 
 
 80. Paul Rosseau, Existential Suffering and Palliative Sedation: A Brief Commentary with a 
Proposal for Clinical Guidelines, 18 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 151, 151-52 (2001). 
 81. See THOMASMA, supra note 31, at 165, 185. See also Roger S. Magnusson, The 
Devil’s Choice: Re-Thinking Law, Ethics, and Symptom Relief in Palliative Care, 34 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 559, 566 (2006) (arguing for a legal defense of necessity be allowed when symptom 
relief is ineffective and palliative interventions shorten the life of a patient). 
 82. Harold I. Schwartz, Death Row Syndrome and Demoralization: Psychiatric Means to 
Social Policy Ends, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 153, 154 (2005). 
 83. David W. Kissane, The Contribution of Demoralization to End of Life Decisionmaking, 
34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 23 (2004). 
 84. Id. at 29. 
 85. RONALD A. LINDSAY, FUTURE BIOETHICS: OVERCOMING TABOOS, MYTHS, AND DOGMAS 
111 (2008). 
 86. Id. at 112. 
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here, mental suffering — and to assure the dying patient's dignity and best 
interests.87 
D. Early Terminal Sedation 
As contentious as palliative or terminal sedation is, early terminal 
sedation (ETS) is even more inflammatory for some — but for others, it is 
seen as a progressive and humane treatment.88 Under this procedure, a 
patient — with consent — is sedated before “actively dying.”89 As such, the 
process combines palliative sedation with a cessation of nutrition and 
hydration.90 The distinction between ETS and palliative sedation is that in the 
former, patients are capable of receiving alimentation and hydration orally 
or parenterally but exercise their right to refuse this treatment. In causing 
palliative or terminal sedation, however, sedation is administered to those 
for whom nutrition and hydration are no longer life-sustaining.91 Often 
analogized — incorrectly to assisted suicide — ETS should be viewed as but 
“translating” the choice of a patient to refuse nutrition and hydration by the 
patient with deep, continuous sedation.92 
Given prognostic uncertainties on the progression of certain chronic 
diseases — and the desire of some patients to exercise their right of 
autonomy by managing their end-stage care, it has been predicted that ETS 
will rise93 — especially so, as dementia cases rise within the population and 
patients wish to act before their cognitive powers are lost.94 Presently in 
America, there are more than five million Americans who have Alzheimer’s 
disease — and this figure could be tripled by 2050.95 Indeed, someone is 
diagnosed with this disease every sixty-eight seconds.96 
 
 87. THOMASMA & GRAEBER, supra note 39, at 192, 194 (quoting Dr. Edmund D. 
Pellegrino). See Pellegrino, supra note 60. 
 88. See Victor Cellarius, Early Terminal Sedation is a Distinct Entity, 25 BIOETHICS 47 
(2011). 
 89. Id. at 47, 50-52, 54. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. See Lois Shepherd, In Respect of People Living in a Permanent Vegetative State—
And Allowing Them to Die, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 631 (2006). 
 92. Cellarius, supra note 88, at 51. 
 93. Id. at 48. See Magnusson, supra note 81. 
 94. Rosemary Bennett, Aided Suicide will Increasingly be Choice of Dementia Patients, 
THE TIMES, May 31, 2013, at 12. 
 95. See ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION, http://www.alz.org/alzheimers_disease_facts_and_fig 
ures.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
 96. Id. 
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IV.  ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES: HOLISTIC MEDICINE COMPATIBILITIES 
Catholic moral theology has never accepted the notion that “human life 
must be sustained at virtually all costs.”97 Even though the sanctity and 
sacredness of all life is a given, the Catholic tradition acknowledges “the 
ethical import of at least some degree of quality of life,” and further accepts 
“at some point, a lack of quality means that life can be let go.”98 This 
compassionate approach to a theology of human life in healthcare ethics is 
given focus and application in the distinction drawn between ordinary and 
extraordinary ends taken to preserve life.99 
Taking its foundational roots from positions taken by His Holiness Pope 
Pius XII in the 1940’s and 1950’s, the Catholic position is that “it is never 
obligatory to make use of medical measures that are morally extraordinary 
in order to preserve life.”100 Indeed, the 1994 Catechism of The Catholic 
Church states unequivocally that, “[i]f morality requires respect for the life of 
the body, it does not make it an absolute value.”101 Withdrawing or 
withholding medical treatments are not acts of killing; for, they merely 
“allow a patient to die of the underlying condition.”102 While these courses 
of action may not be “always morally right,” the act of allowing one to die is 
morally valid “when it is the foregoing of morally extra treatment.”103 
 
 97. KELLY, MAGILL & TEN HAVE, supra note 8, at 33. 
 98. Id. See George P. Smith, II, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or 
Apotheosis?, 63 NEB. L. REV. 709 (1984). See also MITCHELL, supra note 28. But see Kevin D. 
O’Rourke, Physician Assisted Suicide: A Religious Perspective, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 433 
(1996). 
 99. KELLY, MAGILL & TEN HAVE, supra note 8, at 33. Held to be a doctrine or, alternatively, 
applied as a rule, the principle of double effect is grounded in Roman Catholic philosophy 
and moral theology. It endeavors to structure specific guidelines to aid in determining when, 
ethically, to pursue a course of action to achieve a good end (here, the reduction of pain and 
suffering at the end-stage of life) — notwithstanding the full comprehension of the fact that 
bad results (e.g., death, possibly) may well flow from the initiating conduct. See Daniel P. 
Sulmasy & Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Rule of Double Effect: Clearing Up the Double Talk, 
159 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 545, 547 (1999). See also MITCHELL, supra note 28, at 23 
(acknowledging the doctrine as giving “moral sanction to well-intended, good actions that 
turn out to have bad effects”). But see Magnusson, supra note 81 (criticizing the imprecision of 
applying the principle of double effect). 
 100. KELLY, MAGILL & TEN HAVE, supra note 8, at 33. 
 101. Id. at 33. 
 102. Id. Nothing in the Christian tradition bind either patients or physicians to pursue 
treatments considered excessively burdensome or futile and confer benefits “disproportionate 
to the burdens it imposes” — be they “physical, emotional or fiscal.” Autonomy, within the 
Christian view, “permits refusing such disproportionate treatments directly or through a living 
will, durable power of attorney, or a ‘do not resuscitate’ order.” Pellegrino, supra note 60, at 
114. See also John F. Kilner, Forgoing Treatment, in DIGNITY AND DYING: A CHRISTIAN 
APPRAISAL 69 (John F. Kilner, Edmund D. Pellegrino & Arlene B. Miller eds., 1996). 
 103. KELLY, MAGILL & TEN HAVE, supra note 8, at 134. 
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There is ethically and legally no reason to distinguish between 
withholding and withdrawing — even though they may indeed “feel 
different.”104 When a moral distinction is sought to be drawn between the 
withholding of treatment and of the withdrawal of it, however, greater blame 
is often attached to the former rather than the latter.105 Consequently, when 
situations of this character arise, even though medically appropriate to 
commence treatment, physicians become reluctant — if not unwilling — to 
act in order to avoid ending it when, subsequently, it becomes 
inappropriate.106 Regrettably, the net effect of this quandary results in under-
treating at-risk patients.107 
Inasmuch as the standard of medical care permits the alleviation of 
physical pain for the dying patient,108 it is also valid — morally and legally 
— to act in this manner.109 Indeed, the medical community has long 
asserted that the use of sedatives is not ever intended directly to hasten 
death.110 Proper pain management may never be rejected by surrogate 
decision makers when patients “are not capable of deciding for 
themselves.”111 For the surrogate to take this position “would be against the 
best interests of the patient.”112 
A. Catholic Bioethicists Recommendations 
Forty-nine signatories of a colloquium organized by the International 
Association of Catholic Bioethicists (IACB) in 2011 issued a powerful 
 
 104. Id. See Daniel Callahan, Terminal Sedation and The Artefactual Fallacy, in TERMINAL 
SEDATION: EUTHANASIA IN DISGUISE 93 (Torbjorn Tannsjo ed., 2004) (concluding that actions 
which withdraw nutrition and hydration are legitimate). 
 105. FIONA RANDALL & ROBIN S. DOWNIE, PALLIATIVE CARE ETHICS: A GOOD COMPANION 74 
(1996). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. KELLY, MAGILL & TEN HAVE, supra note 8, at 135. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Glenys Williams, The Principle of Double Effect and Terminal Sedation, 9 MEDICAL L. 
REV. 41, 46 (2001). See Richard A. McCormick, Theology and Bioethics, in THE HEALTH CARE 
PROFESSIONAL AS FRIEND AND HEALER: BUILDING ON THE WORK OF EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO 244, 
254-55 (David C. Thomasma & Judith Lee Kissell eds., 2000) (discussing how “faith informs 
reason” and – as such – influences bioethical decision making and thus validates the 
conclusion made by His Holiness Pope Pius XII in his address to the International Congress of 
Anesthesiologists in 1952 that not all medical means must be used to preserve the end-stage 
of life (citing Pope Pius XII, 49 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 1031-32 (1957))). 
 111. KELLY, MAGILL & TEN HAVE, supra note 8, at 238. 
 112. Id. at 238-39. See also Jonathan Herring, Forging a relational approach: Best 
Interests or Human Right?, 13 MEDICAL L. INT’L. 32 (2013). 
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statement which is germane to this present analysis.113 Four central 
conclusions reached were that: 
1. Society needs “to collaborate in providing and promoting the best 
possible holistic care of persons who are seriously ill or dying . . . so that 
their physical, psychological, existential, social, and spiritual needs can be 
appropriately addressed.”114 
2. The same standards of “good therapeutic practice that inform other areas 
of health care” should guide any and all treatment decisions for the 
seriously ill and the dying.115 
3. A relationship between healthcare providers and those seriously ill or 
dying patients whom they are treating grounded in trust and benevolence 
promotes competent and ethical care.116 
4. Existential or “Spiritual” Suffering should be acknowledged and 
addressed accordingly by utilizing those “holistic interventions” deemed 
appropriate to the individual case.117 “Mild to moderate levels of sedation 
might . . . be appropriate in some instances when existential [suffering] is 
refractory.”118 
What is seen by this statement is the medical, ethical, philosophical, and 
spiritual acknowledgement that these four disciplines are symbiotic if not 
complementary and not antagonistic in both their quest and their 
application to addressing (and thereby managing) the somatic and 
nonsomatic, or existential pain and suffering of individuals holistically. 
Indeed, it is an uppermost duty of the state, itself, to safeguard its citizenry 
from cruel and unusual punishment and promote Social Justice through 
accessible healthcare.119 
 
 113. International Association of Catholic Bioethicists, The Use of Sedatives in the Care of 
Persons Who are Seriously Ill or Dying: Ethical Distinctions and Practical Recommendations, 12 
NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 494, 494-501 (2012). 
 114. Id. at 500. 
 115. Id. at 497. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Doctors Must Not Kill, in EUTHANASIA: THE 
GOOD OF THE PATIENT, THE GOOD OF SOCIETY 27, 32 (Robert I. Misbin ed., 1992) (where, 
while not denying the understandable grounds for request of terminally ill patients to hasten 
their deaths, Dr. Pellegrino eschews assisted suicide or active euthanasia and – instead – 
stresses the obligation of physicians to “practice competent analgesia, to understand why the 
patient requests death, and to deal with and remove those reasons in a program of palliative 
care”). 
 116. International Association of Catholic Bioethicists, supra note 113, at 497-98. 
 117. Id. at 498. 
 118. Id. See Pellegrino, supra note 115. 
 119. See generally ROSAMOND RHODES, MARGARET P. BATTIN & ANITA SILVERS, MEDICINE AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH CARE (2d ed. 2012) (outlining the 
importance to access to healthcare). See Smith, supra note 14. See also HERRING, supra note 
54, at 88-151; Abdu’l-Missagh Ghadrian, Spiritual Dimensions of the Whole Person, in 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The whole person care paradigm is, perhaps, the greatest challenge to 
healthcare management in the twenty-first century; and, at the same time, 
holds the greatest promise for realization.120 Death anxiety and existential 
concerns challenge not only patients, but health professionals121 and 
patients’ families as well.122 Indeed, non-somatic suffering is just as 
significant as somatic pain at all levels of society.123 Physicians and other 
healthcare providers “need to recognize how their own non-conscious death 
fears, combined with the abundant reminders of death that are typical of 
medical practice . . . influence how they diagnose and treat patients.”124 
The psycho-social and the spiritual aspects of healthcare become more 
prominent with every biotechnological advance125 — this, essentially 
because of their interconnectedness126 and goal-sharing of alleviating pain 
and suffering at all levels,127 and the further growing realization that 
scientific research is revealing some “specific biological pathways, notably in 
the brain, mediating social and psychological processes.”128 Practical 
effectiveness of good clinical medicine today requires “establishing a 
 
WHOLE PERSON CARE: A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 149 (Tom A. Hutchinson ed., 
2011). 
 120. See Solomon & Lawlor, supra note 62, at 98; Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and 
Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 
10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47, 47 (1994). 
 121. Solomon & Lawlor, supra note 62, at 98. 
 122. See, e.g., Mark Epstein, THE TRAUMA OF EVERYDAY LIFE: A GUIDE TO INNER PEACE 
(2013); Mark Epstein, Op-Ed, The Trauma of Being Alive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2013, at SR8, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/opinion/sunday/the-trauma-of-being-a 
live.html?_r=0. 
 123. SUSAN CHATER ET AL., SEDATION FOR INTRACTABLE DISTRESS IN THE DYING—A SURVEY OF 
EXPERTS, 257 (Palliative Medicine 1998). See also Sandhya Somashelshar & Juliet Eilparin, 
Insurers Directed to Treat Mental Health Issues the Same as Physical Ailments, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 8, 2013, at A2 (discussing new final rules – after five years of preparation – under the 
2008 Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act and the 2010 Affordable Care Act which direct 
healthcare insurers to treat coverage for mental health on an equal footing with somatic 
illness). 
 124. Solomon & Lawlor, supra note 62, at 101, 105-06. See also Gregory Fricchine, 
Separation-Attachment Theory in Illness and the Role of the Healthcare Practitioner, in WHOLE 
PERSON CARE: A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 45 (Tom A. Hutchinson ed., 2011). 
 125. See SAM PARNIA & JOSH YOUNG, ERASING DEATH: THE SCIENCE THAT IS REWRITING THE 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH (2013); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, 
ETHICS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (1989). 
 126. See Liben, supra note 61. 
 127. See SMITH, supra note 11, at 61; GEORGE P. SMITH, II, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE 
NEW MEDICINE (Edward Elgar ed., 2008). 
 128. COX, CAMPELL & FULFORD, supra note 13, at 24. 
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genuinely human relationship between patient and doctor.”129 Achieving this 
can only be accomplished by “considering all facets of the person, including 
their beliefs (faiths) and spiritual understanding.”130 
Rather than being completely socialized into a Western medical culture, 
which predisposes them to “do more” (e.g., investigations, interventions, 
and uses of new medical technologies),131 and thus emphasizing “curing 
and fixing” rather than “healing/bearing witness/being with; ”contemporary 
healthcare professionals need to be more intellectually honest and 
forthcoming in acknowledging when “death is imminent, inevitable, and 
perhaps timely.”132 Patient adjusted care demands — first and foremost — a 
standard of total honesty between patient and physician133 — for, without it, 
there can be no conscious opportunity for informed consent to be 
operative.134 When both the healer and the patient are capable of 
confronting, specifically, their existential fears regarding a terminal medical 
condition and the mortality that attaches to it,135 whole person care and the 
very integrity of cura personalis are validated; an appropriate measures may 
be undertaken in order to alleviate the conditions. Proportional humane 
medical responses to patient suffering — of whatever character — at the 
end-stage of life, should be given medically and allowed legally.136 
A national dialogue must continue over how best to “manage death” at 
its end-stage.137 An integral part of this discussion must evaluate humane, 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. See Antje Du Bois-Pedain, The Duty to Preserve Life and Its Limits in English Law, in 
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 296, 305-09 
(Dennis J. Baker & Jeremy Horde eds., 2013) (observing a “morality of care” is imposed upon 
a physician to accept patients as “concrete individuals”). See also Sulmasy, supra note 63, at 
195-96. 
 131. See STANLEY J. REISER, TECHNOLOGICAL MEDICINE: THE CHANGING WORLD OF DOCTORS 
AND PATIENTS (2009). For some, questing for immortality has led medical technology to 
explore cryonic preservation as an “alternative” to accepting the finality of death. See George 
P. Smith, II, Pathways to Immortality in the New Millennium: Human Responsibility, Theological 
Direction, or Legal Mandate, 15 St. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 447, 459-61 (1996). 
 132. Solomon & Lawlor, supra note 62, at 104. 
 133. See THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 38, at 217. See EDMUND D. 
PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR MEDICAL PRACTICE: TOWARD A 
PHILOSOPHY AND ETHIC OF THE HEALING PROFESSION (Oxford Univ. Press, 1981). 
 134. GEORGE P. SMITH, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 111, 
113 (2004). See Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must it Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 70 (1994). 
 135. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Character, Virtue and Self Interest, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 53 (1989). 
 136. See EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THE PATIENT’S GOOD: THE 
RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE viii (1988). 
 137. See SMITH, supra note 23; Edmund D. Pellegrino, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, in 
DIGNITY AND DYING: A CHRISTIAN APPRAISAL 105 (John F. Kilner et al. eds., 1996). See FIONA 
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compassionate approaches, together with efficacious medical treatments 
which seek to balance vitalism, or sanctity of life, with quality of life as 
consistent with established or sound medical practices.138 
In the United States, it is estimated that spending on end-of-life care is 
between 10 to 12 percent of overall spending for healthcare.139 Between 25 
to 30 percent of all Medicare benefits are expended for end-of-life care.140 
There is a significant volume of evidence which substantiates the conclusion 
that, in multiple healthcare settings such as hospitals and in nursing homes, 
end-of-life care is cost effective.141 
The central ethical question in death management remains: namely, the 
extent to which “marginally beneficial” treatment should be offered and then 
maintained.142 Because of the inherently subjective nature of weighing costs 
versus benefits and considering over-utilization or under-utilization of 
medical care and treatment, a “just right” mean between these options will 
be exceedingly difficult to set or establish.143 
The doctrine of medical futility is an efficacious framework for principled 
decision-making within the medical profession.144 Acceptance of this 
doctrine as a construct for medical decisions allows — in turn — for a 
greater openness to utilize palliative sedation. When necessary to 
accommodate the best interests of a patient and to alleviate refractory pain 
 
RANDALL & ROBIN DOWNIE, END OF LIFE CHOICE: CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY (Oxford Univ. 
Press ed., 1st ed. 2009). 
 138. See PARTNERS IN PALLIATIVE CARE: ENHANCING ETHICS IN CARE AT THE END OF LIFE (Mary 
Beth Morrissey & Bruce Jennings eds., 2013). See Pellegrino, supra note 115; Shepherd, 
supra note 91. See IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS FOR OUR TIME (Robert P. Kraymack 
& Glenn Tinder eds., 2003). See Cathy Lynn Grossmann, A Look at Religion’s Effect on 
Minority End of Life Views: Pew Research Center Survey Highlights Black and Hispanic 
Preferences for Aggressive Treatment in the Face of Incurable Disease and Great Pain, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 30, 2013, at B2. 
 139. PARTNERS IN PALLIATIVE CARE: ENHANCING ETHICS IN CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, supra note 
138, at 111. 
 140. Id. at 112. 
 141. Id. at 119. 
 142. Id. See also PELLEGRINO, supra note 60, at 108. 
 143. PARTNERS IN PALLIATIVE CARE: ENHANCING ETHICS IN CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, supra note 
138. See also Pellegrino, supra note 60, at 108. 
 144. See Smith, Utility and the Principle of Medical Futility, supra note 54, at 6. See C. 
Christopher Hook, Medical Futility, in DIGNITY AND DYING: A CHRISTIAN APPRAISAL 84 (John F. 
Kilner et al. eds., 1996) (when treatment is judged futile by competent medical authority, there 
is an “obligation to refrain from demanding” such treatment be provided). See Philip G. 
Peters, Jr., When Physicians Balk at Futile Care: Implications of the Disability Rights Law, 91 
N.W. U. L. REV. 798, 800 (1997) (explaining preferable approaches to futility cases). See also 
Meir Katz, When Is Medical Care “Futile?” The Institutional Competence of the Medical 
Profession Regarding the Provision of Life-Sustaining Medical Care, 90 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5-7 
(2011). 
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and suffering, compassion and common sense, then, become the 
cornerstones of end-of-life management, care, or treatment.145 
  
 
 145. See George P. Smith, Gently into the Good Night: Toward a Compassionate 
Response to End-Stage Illness, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 476, 490-92 (2013). As Dr. 
Edmund D. Pellegrino has observed: “a dignified death is one in which the suffering person 
takes advantage of all the measures to relieve pain and ameliorate the things that cause a loss 
of imputed dignity but also that his or her innate dignity remains . . . which is at the root of our 
existence as creatures.” Pellegrino, supra note 60, at 113. See also Cass Sunstein, The Right 
to Die, 106 YALE L. J. 1123, 1163 (1997); Magnusson, supra note 81, at 560. 
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